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Abstract 
This paper discusses about the ownership structure of firms and the probability of a financial distress warning 
happening in Taiwan. Our sample covers all listed common stock companiesexceptthe financial industry from 2006 to 
2014. This study usesthe Z-score to measure the probability of firms’ financial distress warning happening and employs 
the shareholding ratio of managerial share ownership, the shareholding ratio of financial institutional investors, and the 
size of the board of directors to measure firms’ ownership structure. For our results, the shareholding ratio of managerial 
share ownership has positive relationship with the probability of a financial distress warning happening, while the 
shareholding ratio of institutional investors and the size of the board of directors have a negative relationship with the 
probability of the same warning happening. 
Keywords: ownership structure, financial distress warming, shareholding ratio of investors, board ofdirectors 
JEL Classification:C58,D53,G11, G31, M14 
1. Introduction 
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD) considers that a board of directors helps 
investigate and guide company strategy, inspects firm performance, chooses a high level agent of business,, and ensures 
the correct accounting of the company and its financial reporting. The board of directors are requested to handle 
company business, make fair and objective judgments, and have enough external board of director member who will 
exercise their independent judgment when the firm faces a business conflict or negative condition. In addition to 
holding effective meetings, the board of director’s members should have enough time and power to immediately obtain 
accurate information to implement their job. 
In order to control for risk, this study follows the principle of corporate governance, as formulated by OECD in 1998.In 
order to reduce risk and pursue the highest benefit, a board of directors has toprotecting shareholders rights, give 
equitable shareholder treatment, and be responsible for company financial. 
In 2006a crisis occurred in Taiwan when China Rebar, a listed firm, was found to have conducted severe embezzlement 
and illegally over-extended a large amount of loans. Following this event, Taiwan’s Financial Supervisory 
Commission(FSC) decided to raise the standard of corporate governance and control risk, focusing on making many 
changes. The rule of corporate governance was deep in the mechanism, as strong as possiblethe interterm of corporate 
governance. As a result, FSC’s actions helped to raise the efficiency of corporate governance and pushed company 
boards of directors to take part in the governance. 
The agency problem has always existed in companies. One of the agency problems is external creditorsandshareholders, 
whileanother is internal managers and shareholders. Agency problems have frequently occurred in Taiwan, such as the 
examples of Pacific Electric Wire & Cablein 2003, Bardon-Chinese Media Agency in 2004,ChinaRebarin 2007, etc. 
These company eventsbrought about a financial crisis to the market both big and small, and there was never a strong 
monitor mechanism installed internally. If an internal monitor mechanism does not work, then such a financial crisis 
can easily severely influence social stability and financial order. 
Applied Economics and Finance                                                                 Vol. 4, No. 1; 2017 
35 
 
Since there are many types of pyramid structure existing in Taiwan, we discuss the corporate ownership structure in this 
paper. Lemmon & Lins (2001) support that firms, througha pyramid structure and cross-shareholdings, expand and 
deviate the degree of cash flow and control rights, leading the controllingowner to hold most of the company’s assets. 
Therefore, as the controlling owner has more ownership, the firm’s value suffers more damage. 
The agency problem has a negative impact on financial performance. When the goals of managers and shareholders are 
different, the manager will make unwise decisions that reduce the firm’s financial performance and harm shareholders’ 
benefits. If the firms do not have a good internal governance mechanism, then they are open to exposure to many forms 
of risk. Lower financial performance and such risk exposure will make these firms remain stuck in difficult operating 
situations. Thus, we discuss the relationship between corporate ownership structure and financial distress warning in 
this paper. 
The rest of the study is formulated as follows. Section 2 describes the related literature on corporate ownership structure 
and financial distress warning. We then present hypothesis development in section 3. Section 4 illustrates the dataset 
and the variables.Section 5 analyzes the empirical results. Finally, section 6 provides the conclusion for this paper. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Ownership Structure 
In prior research, there are three relationships between ownership structure and financial performance. From point of 
corporate ownership structure, many scholars have different views on managers who hold shares that influence 
corporate value. Here, we discuss these relationships in sequence as: positive, negative, and without relation. 
2.1.1 Positive Relationship 
Jensen &Meckling (1976) examine the convergence of the interest hypothesis, whereby in order to reduce agency cost, 
those at the managerial level hold the same high number of shares as the director of external stakeholders. Managers 
will actively runthe firm and make its efficiency grow better, and thus a financial crisis will not easily take place. 
Sincefirmmanagement also enjoys its achievement, when the company loses money, the agent also becomes burdened 
with the loss. 
The extensive literature on the convergence of interest hypothesiswas first formalized by Jensen &Meckling (1976), 
whonoted that because the shareholdings areconcentrated in the hands ofmanagers, these managers take the 
responsibility to expand corporate wealth, and so they would not waste money trying to make the firmefficient.If the 
ownership concentration is with the major shareholders, then they would have some reason to control the firm’s 
managers. For example, major shareholders not only can make good performance, but also can create high corporate 
value. Therefore, corporate value and performance would have the positive. 
Chenet al. (2014) finds thatwhen the interaction between major shareholders increases, the average of the board of 
directors related to corporate value and stock price will show a better corporate performance, the interaction between 
outside major stockholders will decrease, and the board of directors will increase related to corporate value and stock 
price. 
2.1.2 Negative Relationship 
The conflict of interest hypothesis (Jensen &Ruback, 1983) suggests that managers who have a higher shareholding 
ratio will neglect the benefit of shareholders. As a result, when managers reject a higher valuation from a takeover bid 
or be in conflict with the benefits of minority shareholders, this causes the firm to be in a poor financial situation. Fan& 
Wong (2002) & Liu (2012) note anegative relationship between the insider shareholding ratio and financial performance. 
Both of those studies’ evidence fits in withthe conflict of interest hypothesis. 
Demsetz (1983) advances the entrenchment hypothesis, which parallels the conflict of interest hypothesis. This 
hypothesis suggests that there is a negative relationship between the shareholding ratio of managers and financial 
performance or firm value. When shareholdings are centralized with managers, anti-takeover behavior activities usually 
occur, such as managersrejecting a merger and acquisition case that is valuable to shareholders. As a result, the 
expenditure preference ofmanagers’ behavioris more serious, and it willreduce the firm’s financial performance and 
harm the firm’s value. 
2.1.3 Withoutrelationship 
Fama (1980) suggests that price value could respond to financial performance, since the capital market is efficient and 
there is an external supervisionmechanism. When managers work hard to maximize earnings, the external management 
mechanism will supervise them. Financial performance depends on the external supervisionmechanism and the efficient 
market hypothesis, and therefore there is no relationship with ownership structure. 
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2.2 Financial Distress Warning 
Sudi& Jimi (2001) states that there are three stages to corporate bankruptcy. The first oneis the low financial return 
stage. Inappropriate management leads to a decrease in annual investment returns, productive forces, and salesrate. The 
second one is the financial structure deterioration stage. As investment returns do not meet expectations, a firm’s cash 
flow decreases, and corporate debt may arise in order to solve the demand for corporate capital, thus leading to a firm’s 
higher debt ratio. The third one is that a crisis reveals a failure stage. At this stage, the corporate has low profitability, 
bad cash liquidity, and high debt ratio. These problems eventually lead to a corporate default, bounced checks, the 
corporate announcing bankruptcy, and then the eventual shutdown of the firm. 
Wu (2002) indicates that a financial crisis that happens at the corporate level is not good for performance even in the 
same industry. In order to avoid the influence of a financial crisis, a corporate could conduct window dressing of its 
financial statements.Hsieh (2011) suggests that when firms face financial problems, they will manipulate earnings to 
match analysts’ forecasts. Because they need to provide financial reports to investors, managers typically try to delay 
any serious problem, even employing discretionary accruals or real activities to decorate these reports. Therefore, 
managers of financially distressed firms will deliver inaccurate information on financial reports, leading to investors 
getting the wrong information and overestimating the firms’ earnings. 
The literature has mentioned many cases of financial distress in both Taiwan and abroad, including the use of corporate 
assets to make more money or conducting illegal trade. In above literatures, financial reports were used to examine the 
probability of a firm’s financial distress warning, and such models can 97.99% correctly forecast such a warning. In 
other words, these models are able to judge between normal and financially distressedcorporate. 
2.3 Ownership Structure and Financial Distress Warning 
Lee &Yeh (2004) find that a corporate governance index has a significantly positive explanatory and forecast ability to 
a corporate financial crisis.Yeh et al. (2001)show that the better a corporate governance mechanism is, the higher the 
corporate value will be and the lowerthe possibility is fora financial crisis happening. Therefore, a corporate governance 
index has a positive relationship with the possibility of financial crisis happening. 
Mcconnel&Servaes (1990) consider that the insider shareholder ratio is an important control mechanism and has a 
positive correlation with corporate value. In the prior literature of domestic,Yeh&Chiu (1996) state that the relevance of 
a listed corporate’s ownership structure and the company value correspond to the convergence of interest hypothesis in 
Taiwan. Therefore, ahigher shareholding ratio of directors and supervisors will be more consistent with the benefits to 
external shareholders, directors and supervisors andimply strong supervision and self-discipline. Chiang (2013) finds 
that the shareholding ratio of domestic institutions and dealers, who are two kinds of institutional investorsinTaiwan’s 
capital market, significantly decreases before a financial crisis happens.  
In order to develop a financial distress warningsystem and risk management, Chiu (2012) considers the agency problem 
and finds which variable would affect a firm’s financial performance in order to estimate the probability of a financial 
crisis happening. Evidence shows that firms setting up independent directorships could reduce the probability of risk 
happening and increase the power of corporate governance. Thus, the firms canimprove their performance and stave 
offa financial crisis. 
3. Hypothesis 
When a corporateis involved in an embezzling or financial crisis, the shareholding ratio of managerial share ownership 
can be an important signal if insiders are selling their shares quickly. Compared to a normal company, when the 
shareholdings of directors and supervisors of a company turn lower and there is a higher amount of pledged shares by 
directors, this could positively prove that a financial crisis is about to happen. Companies under a financial crisis 
typically have a situation where the chairperson of the board is also the head manager. Therefore, this situation has a 
positive relationship to the probability of a financial crisis happening. 
Leland & Pyle (1977) state thatthe agency theory believes that higher managerial share ownership implies higher 
corporate performance.Watson (2013) examines how ownership is related to financing, noting the negative relationship 
of ownership concentration with financial leverage and the positive relationship of managerial share ownership with 
financial leverage. 
From the static tradeoff theory, when there is higher financial leverage, the probability of a financial crisis erupting will 
become a constant problem. This means the cost from a financial crisis cost may offset the benefit from financing. 
Therefore, it will be positive inmanagerial share ownership, financial leverage, and financial crisis. Based on the above 
literature, we state the hypothesis as below. 
H1: There is apositive relationship between the shareholding ratio of managerial share ownership and the probability of 
a financial distress warning happening. 
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Liping (2006) shows that institutional investors who are external shareholders have a negative relationship with their 
firms’ financial performance. Financial institutions do not execute monitoring and promoting functions. Since the 
financial institutions are institutional investors, they just want to obtain a capital return rather than be involved in 
strategic investments. Therefore, financial institutions do not actively participate in the corporate strategy of listed 
companies. At the same time, financial institutions take advantage of funds and information to potentially manipulate 
the stock prices of listed companies and interfere in corporates’ normal operations. Liu (2012) finds that the 
shareholding ratio of financial institutional investors, when it is not over eight percent, has a positive relationship with 
corporate performance and corresponds to the convergence of interest hypothesis. If the shareholding ratio of financial 
institutional investors is over eight percent, there is a negative relationship with corporate performance and corresponds 
to the conflict of interest hypothesis. 
H2: There is apositiverelationship between the shareholding ratio of financial institutional investors and the probability 
of a financial distress warning happening. 
Prior research suggests that institutional investors play an important role in supervising managers (Seetharaman et al., 
2001; Agrawal&Mandelker, 1990), and the shareholding ratio of institutional investors is an index of corporate 
government (Cremers& Nair, 2005; Monks &Minow, 1995).Pound (1988) advances the efficient monitoring hypothesis, 
which considers institutional investors have more advantages, such as professional knowledge, information, and capital. 
For this reason, institutional investors can supervise with low cost efficiency, thereby decreasing agency problems and 
increasing performance. Therefore, there is a positive relationship between the shareholding ratio of institutional 
investors and financial performance. 
Balsam et al. (2002)&McConnel&Servaes (1990)supportthe efficient monitoring hypothesis, finding that the 
shareholding ratio of institutional investors could enhance the supervision ofmanagers. Coffee (1991) also supports this 
hypothesis, since institutional investors would want to hold out for a higher per share price in order to sell at greater 
profit. For this reason, institutional investors would supervise managers positively. The evidence shows that the 
shareholding ratio of institutional investors has a negative relationship with financial performance. However, the 
probability ofa financial distress warninghappening will decrease if the firmexhibits high financial performance. Hence, 
we infer that the shareholding ratio of institutional investors has anegative relationship with the probability of a 
financial distress warning happening. 
H3: There is a negative relationship between the shareholding ratio of institutional investors and the probability of a 
financial distress warning happening. 
Lipton &Lorsch (1992)suggestthat the scale of the board of directors and corporate performance has a positive 
relationship.A large board of directors is able tohelp supervise the corporate in making a good financial performance. 
Chiu (2012) propose that positive returns due to corporate performance help reduce risk. In order to reduce the 
probability of risk, setting up independent directors and supervisors not only can assist in financing decisions, but also 
can raise the performance of corporate governance. Therefore, there is a positive relationship between the scale of board 
of directors and corporate performance, thus reducing the probability of a financial crisis. 
Bacon (1973) considers that a large board of directors could contain many different kinds of field specialists who have 
professional knowledge, and hence they would put their heads together so as to get better results from firm decisions. 
Therefore, the size of the board of directors has a positive relationship with financial performance. Rindova (1999) also 
suggests that firms could broaden the size of the board of directors, because specialists in different fields could handle 
threats and opportunities from changes in business conditions.A larger size of the board of directors has more powerful 
supervision and many external resources, thereby influencing firm performance. Since the probability of a financial 
distress warning happening will increase when the firm’s financial performance is not good, we infer that the size of the 
board of directors has anegativerelationshipwith such probability. 
H4: There is a negative relationship between the size of the board of directors and the probability of a financial distress 
warning happening. 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1 Sample Description 
We extracted the datafromthe Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) databasefortheyears 2006-2014. Thedata sample 
includesTaiwanpubliclylisted companies for atotal sample of7,801dataobservations. 
Sincecorporategovernancespecificationswere initiated in 2006, weanalyzethe impacts after this change and whether a 
company’s finances turnedsounder. 
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4.2 Variables 
4.2.1 Dependent Variable 
We use the dummy variable of the Z-Score to calculate the company’s value to predict the possibility of the firm 
goingbankrupt in two years. TheZ-Score modelisfromEdward Altman in 1968.He uses 22 financial ratios to build five 
variable Z-score models. TheZ-score model is a formula with many finance variables. It measures a company’s 
financialcondition and estimates the possibility of company bankruptcy within 2 years. 
  Z = 1.2𝑥1 + 1.4𝑥2 + 3.3𝑥3 + 0.6𝑥4 + 0.99𝑥5                                                         (1) 
x1=working capital/total assets. This variable reflects the ability and scale characteristics of a company’s property and 
assets. Ifthe working capital of a companycontinuouslydecreases, then it usually indicatesthe company has cash flow 
problems or has a crisis of repaying debt in the near term. 
x2=retained earnings/total assets. This reflects the accumulation of company profits. When there is more income, there 
is agreater surplus ability for the company topay interest on its shares. 
x3=operating profit/total assets.This evaluates the company’s profit margin. 
x4=market value/gross liability. This reflects the size of firm value. 
x5=sales income/total assets. This reflects the total operation ability of the enterprise and the management efficiency of 
total assets. 
If the Z value is smaller, then the probability of a company financial crisis happening ishigher; if the Z value is larger, 
then the probability is smaller.Therefore,accordingtothe Z-score definition, we set up dependent variableas a dummy. If 
the Z valueis more than 2.675,then the financial standing of the company is good and bankruptcy possibility is the 
smallest. However, if the Z value is less than 2.675, then bankruptcy possibility is the biggest. 
4.2.2 Independent Variable 
This study consists of four independent variables. The first is the shareholding ratio of managers. For each listed 
company, we look at the first five largest shareholders and total up their shareholding ratio. If the ratio is more than 10%, 
then we denote it as 1; otherwise, 0.The second is the financial institutions shareholding ratio. This ratio is domestic 
financialinstitutions shareholding ratio plus foreign financial institutions shareholding ratio.The third variable is the 
foundationsshareholding ratio. This ratio is the sum of the ratios of domestic government shareholding, domestic trust 
funds, domestic company foundations, domestic other foundations, foreign trust funds, and foreign foundations. The 
last independent variable is the scale of the board of directors. We use the number of directors to measure the size of the 
board of directors. 
4.2.3 Control Variable 
(1)Debt Ratio=(gross liability/total assets)×100% 
(2)Company Size=ln(total assets) 
(3)Return on Assets=(before the tax before the interest often continuousnet 
profit before depreciating/average total assets)×100% 
4.2.4 Construction of Financial Crisis in the Logit Model 
According Altman (1968), we use multiple discriminate analysis to predict whether companies are in a financial crisis. 
We employ the five representative financial variables to establish the Z-Score model. Moreover, the Z-Score model is 
used to calculate z-scores; if the value is greater than 2.675, then it implies normal companies(Y=0); if the value is less 
than 2.675, then companies are heading for a financial crisis(Y=1). Finally, we use alogit model to predict the 
bankruptcy possibility of a company. 
Y(Ζ) = β0 + β1            + β2          + β3          + β4  + β5       L              (2) 
In equation (2), MGT_HOLDING_D1 is a dummy variable. If the manager shareholding ratio value is more than 
10%, then it is denoted by 1; if the value is less than 10%, then 0. Other variables are defined as noted above. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 is the descriptive statistics ofeach variable’s value. According to the following table, we are able to understand 
the changein the number of data distribution situationthroughdescriptive statistics analysis. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Summary Statistics 
 Z MGT_HOLDING FIN_HOLDING CRO_HOLDING BS DEBT SCALE ROA 
 Mean  0.588115  0.980435  2.655023  38.33231  4.941451  44.29571  27165.03  9.245166 
 Median  1.000000  1.000000  0.530000  35.85000  4.000000  43.76000  5420.000  8.000000 
 Maximum  1.000000  1.000000  56.51000  99.99000  14.00000  99.13000  3656082.  96.00000 
 Minimum  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.270000  40.00000 -89.80000 
 Std. Dev.  0.492210  0.138510  4.797335  22.15434  2.123987  19.85648  111885.3  8.872008 
 Skewness -0.358064 -6.937715  3.631249  0.381232  1.198834  0.379763  14.33938  0.152088 
 Kurtosis  1.128210  49.13190  22.54571  2.289702  5.425574  2.896642  314.1092  9.827689 
         
 Jarque-Bera  1146.191  662263.9  124075.0  309.8819  3319.546  167.6755  27855852  13329.83 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
         
 Sum  4028.000  6715.000  18184.25  262538.0  33844.00  303381.4  1.86E+08  63320.14 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  1659.073  131.3783  157602.7  3361100.  30893.52  2700027.  8.57E+13  539023.4 
         
 Observations  6849  6849  6849  6849  6849  6849  6849  6849 
5.2 Correlation Coefficient Analysis 
By the correlation coefficient analysis in Table 2, each variable value of the correlation coefficient is smaller than0.8, 
and all relativities are not high. Thus, the correlation between each variable is not high, implying there is nocollinearity. 
Table 2. Correlation Coefficients of Variables 
Probability Z MGT_HOLDING FIN_HOLDING CRO_HOLDING BS DEBT SCALE ROA 
Z 1.000000        
 -----        
MGT_HOLDING -0.000412 1.000000       
 0.9728 -----       
FIN_HOLDING 0.029449 0.019859 1.000000      
 0.0148 0.1003 -----      
CRO_HOLDING -0.001263 -0.008967 0.070830 1.000000     
 0.9168 0.4581 0.0000 -----     
BS 0.123454 7.67E-05 0.121191 0.182321 1.000000    
 0.0000 0.9949 0.0000 0.0000 -----    
DEBT 0.594015 0.029103 0.156169 0.088677 0.117196 1.000000   
 0.0000 0.0160 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----   
SCALE -0.037133 -0.000419 0.168394 0.249696 0.080032 0.049208 1.000000  
 0.0021 0.9723 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----  
ROA -0.379622 -0.014200 0.086935 0.189626 -0.108828 -0.314650 0.158007 1.000000 
 0.0000 0.2400 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ----- 
 
5.3 Empirical Results of Logistic Regression 
Based on Prob. (LR statistic), the whole model is significant. Table 3 shows that the structure of ownership and the size 
of Directors, Managers Shareholding Ratio, Foundations Shareholding Ratio, and the Board of Directors Scale are all 
significant. For the parameters’ estimated value, when the Managers Shareholding Ratio is higher, that representative 
company’s possibility of a financial crisis happening will be reduced; this representative firm with an equity structure 
too concentrated in management’s or internal people’s hands means that management will be charged with incurring any 
wealth loss, thus making managers’ behavior more reasonable and hence reducing a, thus reduced company’s agency 
problem,  
For the logit model, the result that a higher financial institutions shareholding ratio implies a higher possibility of a 
financial crisis is not statistically significant. This could be due to financial institutions invest for investment purposes 
only and do not have the interests of policy holders in mind. Thus, they will not play any monitoring role and that there 
is no significant relationship between the sharesheld by financial institutions and firms ‘financial performance.Forthe 
foundations shareholding ratio, when foundations shareholding ratio is higher,the possibility of a financial crisis is 
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bigger. Another reason is according to Wang et al. (2008), who notes the significantly negative relationship between the 
government institutions holding ratio and company business performance, probably because a higher government stake 
in a company means the board’s decisions shall be subject to the approval of the government. Such decisions are made 
with a lack of flexibility and have an adverse impact on business performance, thus raising the possibility of a financial 
crisis and hence the positive correlation in the model.  
According to Yermack (1996), Thus, a larger size of the board of directors increasesthe possibility of a financial crisis 
happening. The statistics are significant and positively related. Conyon& Peck (1998), Eisenberg et al. (1998), 
&Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) also confirm that a smallerscale of the board will result in 
betterfinancialperformancefor firms.  
Table 3. The Empirical Results of Logit Regression 
McFadden R-squared 0.403792 Mean dependent var. 0.588115 
S.D. dependent var. 0.492210 S.E. of regression 0.355355 
Akaike info. criterion 0.810242 Sum squared resid. 863.8627 
Schwarz criterion 0.818222 Log likelihood -2766.675 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.812995 Deviance 5533.350 
Restr. Deviance 9280.905 Restr. log likelihood -4640.453 
LR statistic 3747.556 Avg. log likelihood -0.403953 
Prob.(LR statistic) 0.000000    
Obs. with Dep.=0 2821 Total obs. 6849 
Obs. with Dep.=1 4028    
Notes: ***,** and * indicated at least significant at 1%,5% and 10% level,respectively. 
6.Conclusion 
With the growth of today’s business organizations, company managers are sometimes sacrificing the interests of 
shareholders at their own expense, while at the same time company directors and supervisors are not playing the role of 
an oversight mechanism. Taiwan’s laws offer weak protection of minority shareholders’ rights, resulting in it being 
difficult to protect the interests of investors and creditors, and so the level of a company’s corporate governance is quite 
important. Corporate governance is part of a firm’s ownership structure. Conflicts of interest can easily form between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, with the worst case leading to a financial crisis in the company. In 
recent years, many global enterprises have encountered financial fraud and/or financial crises, resulting in shocks to 
various financial markets. So, discussion the effect of equity structure and the Board structure on company occurred 
possibility of financial crisis, and less literature for equity structure to discussion the problem of financial default, so 
this study aims to explore the high or low of managers shareholding ratio, financial institutions shareholding ratio, 
foundations shareholding ratio and the board of directors scale which impact of financial crisis in of the company.This 
study has used a logit model for verification and empirical analysis. Our results show that legal ownership and board 
size are positively related to the probability of a financial crisis in a company. When the foundations shareholding ratio 
and the size of the board of directors are higher, there is a greater probability of a financial crisis in the company. The 
empirical results show that the debt ratio, ROA, and size are all statistically significant, representing that when the debt 
Z_score(Y variable) Model 
Constant -3.1343*** 
MGT_HOLDING -0.4677** 
FIN_HOLDING 0.0117 
CRO_HOLDING 0.0033** 
BS 0.1206*** 
DEBT 0.1037*** 
SCALE -1.92E-06*** 
ROA -0.1022*** 
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ratio is high, it is more likely for the company to encounter bankruptcy; when ROA and size are lower, the company 
also faces the possibility of a financial crisis. 
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